The long march of the Chinese workers' and peasants' Red Army is a great revolutionary heroic epic. It declares to the whole of China and the world that the Communist Party of China and its people's army are an invincible force. Here are the reasons why the Red Army was forced into the long march_ The significance and historical value of the Long March are welcome to read and share.
catalogue
Why was the red army forced to go on the long march
Significance and historical value of the long march
The route of the Red Army's Long March
The reason why the Red Army was forced into the long march
The failure of the fifth counter "encirclement and suppression" was the most direct and important reason for the Red Army's Long March
There are two main reasons for the failure of the fifth counter "encirclement and suppression" in the Central Soviet area. One is the strong strength of the enemy, and the other is that our party has made mistakes.
In September 1933, Chiang Kai Shek concentrated 500000 troops and launched the fifth "encirclement and suppression" against the Central Soviet area. The policy of "encirclement and suppression" is to "advance the fortress and camp step by step". To this end, Chiang Kai Shek set up an officer training group in Lushan and hired military instructors from Germany, Italy, the United States and other countries to form a military advisory group, which specially taught the tactics and technology of "encirclement and suppression" of the Red Army, and raised funds to purchase a large number of arms at the same time. With the development of the war situation, the Kuomintang army gradually occupied most of the central revolutionary base areas.
During this period, Wang Ming's "left" dogmatism occupied a dominant position in our party. He divorced himself from the reality of the Chinese revolution, denied the basic situation that the enemy was strong and we were weak, asked the Red Army to take an active offensive line, and advocated attacking central cities in order to achieve the first victory of the revolution in one or several provinces. At the same time, the "left" dogmatism is mainly manifested in "cruel struggle and ruthless attack" in the organization, and military adventurism in the military.
After the fifth counter campaign against "encirclement and suppression" began, the "left" leaders advocated "defending the enemy outside the country", which made the Red Army completely passive in strategy. At that time, the tactics of the Red Army were "Fortress warfare, positional warfare and short-term assault", competing with the superior enemy. This kind of play is only effective when military strength is equal. Chiang Kai Shek combined the financial and military strength of the whole country, while the Central Red Army had less than 100000 people. Coupled with the limited financial and material resources in the Soviet Area, the disadvantage was obvious. The fifth counter "encirclement and suppression" in the Central Soviet area was facing failure, and the party and the Red Army fell into a serious survival crisis.
Considering reopening the new situation of revolution, the CPC Central Committee took the initiative to carry out strategic transfer
When it was no longer possible to crush the enemy's "encirclement and suppression", the CPC Central Committee put forward the idea of strategic transfer in May 1934 and reported to the Comintern. Comintern called back, holding an ambiguous attitude towards the strategic transfer of the Central Red Army, and neither said to let go nor said not to let go. But even so, the CPC Central Committee sent the seventh Red Army expedition to mobilize and contain the enemy encircling the Soviet Area, but it failed to achieve its goal due to too few troops. Subsequently, he sent the sixth Red Army Corps to withdraw from the Hunan Jiangxi base area and join the second Red Army Corps of he long. In doing so, we have the intention to mobilize the enemy and also consider exploring the way for the Central Red Army. The sixth Red Army Corps later joined forces with the second Red Army Corps and acted jointly.
Because the CPC Central Committee implemented Wang Ming's "left" wrong line, the Central Red Army was in a very difficult situation under the Kuomintang's "encirclement and suppression". Therefore, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China led the Central Red Army to withdraw from the Central Soviet Area and go to Western Hunan to meet with the second Red Army Corps of Helong, rebuild the revolutionary base and reopen a new revolutionary situation.
The original relatively stable strategic pattern was broken, and the local long march eventually evolved into the long march of the whole main Red Army
Due to the failure of the fifth counter "encirclement and suppression", the Central Red Army began the long march. However, the Red Army in other places did not fail. Why did they carry out the long march?
The withdrawal of the Central Red Army from the Central Soviet area has put the Red Army in other places under increasing pressure from the Kuomintang army, and the Sichuan Shaanxi revolutionary base area bears the brunt. Among these base areas, in addition to the Central Soviet Area, the Sichuan Shaanxi base area is relatively stable. Zhang Guotao was indeed worried that he would become the next center of the Kuomintang army's "encirclement and suppression". He withdrew to join the red front army in order to "enjoy the cool under the big tree". However, he did not expect the Central Red Army to suffer so heavy losses, which is also an important factor in his ambition expansion.
In addition, one of the important reasons for the long march of the second and sixth corps of the Red Army (the second front army of the Red Army) is that the enemy situation is serious, and it is very difficult to create and preserve revolutionary base areas; The transfer of the red 25th army is also due to the Kuomintang army's strengthening of the "elimination and suppression" of Hubei, Henan and Anhui, and it is very difficult to adhere to the local revolutionary struggle.
Therefore, a very important reason for the successive long march of the local Red Army is that the strategic transfer of the Central Red Army has broken the relatively stable strategic pattern.
The background of Anti Japanese and national salvation has become a major factor that directly affects the decision-making, process and direction of the long march
The September 18th Incident was the beginning of Japan's attempt to perish, and the North China incident was the prelude to Japan's upcoming full-scale war of aggression against China. The national contradiction between China and Japan has become the main contradiction in Chinese society, and anti Japanese and national salvation has become the most urgent task of the whole nation. However, Chiang Kai Shek's stubborn adherence to the reactionary policy of "settling in first before hustling outside" directly contributed to the arrogance of the Japanese aggressors and accelerated their pace of aggression.
The Chinese communists will never sit idly by and watch the fall of the Chinese nation. Although the Red Army is in adversity, it is still on the front line of saving the nation from danger. Before and after the Long March, the CPC Central Committee successively organized two anti Japanese advance teams to go north to resist Japan. In the party's manifestos and documents during this period, it took "resistance against Japan" as its sacred duty. It is precisely because of the great feelings and responsibility of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese workers' and peasants' Red Army to care about the country and the people and save the country and the people, two links can still be realized in the arduous Long March: that is, closely connect the military strategic transfer with the political strategic transformation, and connect the general direction of the Red Army with the establishment of the forward position of resistance against Japan.
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Significance and historical value of the long march
1、 The political significance of the victory of the long march?
1. The victory of the long march smashed Chiang Kai Shek's attempt to strangle the Chinese revolution and turned the Chinese revolution from crisis to safety.
2. The victory of the Red Army's Long March realized our party's general policy of going north to resist Japan.
3. The victory of the Red Army's long march is a victory of the CPC's line and principles in line with China's national conditions.
4. Through the Long March, Comrade Mao Zedong's leading position in the party and the guiding position of Mao Zedong's military thought and political thought were established.
5. The victory of the long march gave the Communist Party of China a solid revolutionary base and a solid rear in the war of resistance against Japan and the war of liberation.
2、 Military significance of the victory of the long march
1. The victory of the Long March shows that adhering to the party's absolute leadership over the army is not only the fundamental principle of army construction, but also the core and soul of our army's fine tradition. Adhering to the party's absolute leadership over the army is a magic weapon for our army to be invincible.
2. The victory of the Long March shows that only unity in thought and line can achieve victory in military struggle.
3. The victory of the long march is the victory of Mao Zedong's military thought.
4. The victory of the Long March also embodies rich experience in military construction and development.
5. The struggle between blood and fire in the long march preserved and tempered the backbone of the Chinese revolution. After the baptism of the Long March, many party members and the Red Army later became the pillars of running the party, the country and the army.
3、 Spiritual significance of the long march
1. The spirit of seeking truth from facts. The long march is a model of the spirit of seeking truth from facts. Proceeding from reality and seeking truth from facts is the basic principle of Marxism. The charm of this principle can be fully reflected in the practice of the long march.
2. The long march is a model of the spirit of hard struggle in human history.
3. The officers and men of the Red Army in the Long March are concerned about others and their spirit of selfless dedication will shine through the ages.
4. The officers and men of the Red Army take the overall situation into consideration and the quality of unity and cooperation shines on history.
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The route of the Red Army's Long March
The starting point of the Red Army's Long March: Ruijin, Jiangxi Province.
The end of the Red Army's Long March: Wuqi in Shaanxi and Huining in Gansu.
All Red Army Long March routes:
1. From October 17, 1934 to October 19, 1935, the red first front army lasted 12 months and 2 days, passing through 11 provinces of Jiangxi, Fujian, Guangdong, Hunan, Guangxi, Guizhou, Yunnan, Sichuan, Tibet, Gansu and Shaanxi.
2. From October 17, 1934 to October 22, 1935, the red second front army lasted 12 months and 5 days and traveled 16000 miles through eight provinces of Hunan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Sichuan, Qinghai, Gansu and Shaanxi.
3. From May 1935 to October 9, 1936, the red fourth front army passed through Sichuan, Tibet, Qinghai and Gansu provinces for more than 8000 miles.
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